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The Concept of Statutory Law in EU Perspective
FRANCESCO BILANCIA*
I. THE HISTORICAL-POLITICAL MEANING OF LAW IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE
A. From Liberal State to the 1930s
The current meaning of the political concept of law is the result of a long
and complex historical evolution. The underlying premise is that law does not
always follow the development of democratic values. On the contrary, the politi-
cal datum of the central role of law is constant in the system of the sources of the
right of the state, as law is usually the most important source. Thus, our reflec-
tion must look for the political roots of the centrality of the law in contemporary
legal systems. We must understand why the doctrines of constitutionalism have
assigned to the centrality of the law a role and meaning of fundamental instru-
ment for the democratic construction of the state's legal system.
In order to narrow the scope of our analysis, I would start from the liberal
state of the nineteenth century. Therefore, I avoid confronting, for example, the
study of the concept of law according to the historical-political doctrines of vol-
untarism (Volontarismo), or the study of the ethical-religious foundations of
law-theories that we still find applied today in both totalitarian and theocratic
systems.
In different contexts, the law can find its foundation in institutional pluralism,'
*Doctorate in Public and Constitutional Law, University of Rome "La Sapienza," 1994; Attor-
ney at Law; Professore straordinario di Diritto costituzionale, University of Chieti-Pescara "G.
D'Annunzio." This comment was delivered at a symposium on Back to Government? The Plural-
istic Deficit in the Decisionmaking Processes and Before the Courts, June 2004, in response to
Francesca Bignami, Pluralism, Corporatism and Republicanism in Domestic Public Law: The Impli-
cations for a European Right to Civil Society Participation.
1. See, e.g., MAGNA CARTA arts. 12, 39 (1215). The Magna Carta was granted by King John in
1215 and established the seeds of the political foundations of the current notion of the rule of law.
Indeed, article 12 established the principle "no taxation without representation," and article 39
based every restriction of the rights of barons on the judgment of their peers according to the law
of their land.
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in common law,2 or in its own representative character. But from the bourgeois
state on, the law assumes the essential meaning of the political and legal center of
the system of the sources of rights.
As it is well known, the stabilization of the legal doctrine founded on the
centrality of the political concept of law arose especially in France and Germany
between the middle of the nineteenth century and the 1930s. However, the sub-
stantial meaning of this political act, an act enforcing the political choices of gov-
ernment, was still not the one presupposed by the contemporary theories of
democracy. This is particularly true in Germany, where the supremacy of the
law is due to its attribution to the state, to the sovereign body (the will), and to
the supreme institutions.
In the first meaning, the centrality of law is justified inasmuch as it is the
child of the sovereignty of the Reich-"the law is the expression of the power of
the State"' (of the Staatsgewalt)4-regardless of how the sovereign functions are
differentiated and allocated by the legal system. In this context, the role of the
representative body (Parliament) and of the monarch complicate the exercise of
the sovereign function. While the former is responsible for defining the content
of laws, the latter holds the actual power of adoption through the sanction of the
act of command directed at the subjects, in the form of law.
The famous conflict between the Parliament and the Crown, 5 which oc-
curred in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, yielded the cat-
2. The laws of the Parliament themselves-or even better, of the King in Parliament-cannot
be entirely compared to the laws of the continental system. Every binding act of the Parliament, in
fact, even if it is not prescriptive, is reconverted according to a hermeneutic (airtight) process in
the logic of the system of common law (above the mixed English Government). See Giuseppe G.
Floridia, Fortuna e crisi del governo misto nella Costituzione inigese, in MATERIALI PER UNA STORIA
DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA 305 (2000).
3. Paul Laband, Das Budgetrecht nach den Bestimmungen der Preussischen Vefassungsurkunde
unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes, in ZEIT FUR GESETZ-
GEBUNG UND RECHTSPFLEFE IN PREUSSEN 625 (1870).
4. Staatsgewalt translates to the power of the State, in the sense that it is used in this paragraph.
5. The famous conflict between Parliament and Crown is comprised of two distinct events: the
conflict between Landtag and Crown, 1862-1866; and the conflict between Reichstag and Govern-
ment, 1878. See Carlo Esposito, Legge, in Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO 720 (Mariano d'Amelio ed.,
1938). See also Carlo Roehrssen, GOVERNO, LEGGE, POLITICA 135 (1969) and Clementine Forte, Pre-
sentazione to Rudolph Gneist & Georg Jellinek, Legge e bilancio & Legge e decreto, in CONTROVERSiE
COSTITUZIONALI IN BASE ALLA CRISI DEL GOVERNO PRUSSIANO DEL MARZO 1878, at v (Clemente Forte
trans., ed., 1997) (1879) on the meaning and value of "budget decision." This was the responsibility
of Parliament, but it was approved in a different way than the law, which was adopted together by
mmmm
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egories of formal and material law. The comparison between these two concepts
will successively illustrate the interpretation of the historical evolution of the re-
lations between law, parliament, and government, concerning the approval of
the state budget. The political concept of state will be linked to the formal con-
cept of law because "only the Sovereign or the supreme State power can issue
laws."6 The circumstance in which only the sovereign or the supreme state
power can adopt formal legislative acts does not theoretically follow from the
concept of law, but from the notion of a state's effective establishment in a given
political community. On the contrary, laws in a material sense can be qualified as
all the sources authorized by the system to issue legal norms or rules-hence,
also the sources of autonomy.
From this context derives, as an immediate consequence, the legal relevance
of the form of the act of will that integrates the law. Thus, while in a material
sense, legislative right can be considered as a concept equivalent tojus scriptum,
in a formal sense, such equivalence will only be true for the written law adopted
on the basis of the public consensus (Zustimmung). This leads to a meaningful
conclusion: laws, in a formal sense, are also those acts ascribed to the state's will
(Willensakte des Staates), for which the consensus of the representative organs
(the Parliament) is necessary; yet, they are acts that could not have normative
content.
Paul Laband claims this model has its own underlying political justification
in the theory of division of powers. But, according to Laband's theory, the politi-
cal concept of representation, in reality, does not assume a central role in the cat-
egorization of the law, which is instead based on the mere form of the act. In fact,
the word "law," in the end, assumes the mere formal meaning of an "act pro-
duced resorting to a specific procedure,"' on the basis of the political representa-
the King and Landtag. From this situation came the theoretical problem of the distinction
between "formal law" and "material law." See Rudolph Gneist, Legge e bilancio, in CONTROVERSIE
COSTITUZIONALI IN BASE ALLA CRISI DEL GOVERNO PRUSSIANO DEL MARZO 1878,supra, at 25, 36, 44, 85,
89; see also Georg Jellinek, Legge edecreto, in CONTROVERSIE COSTITUZIONAI IN BASE ALLA CRISI DEL
GOVERNO PRUSSIANO DEL MARZO 1878, supra, at 230, 237, 254. In opposition to Laband, see the doc-
trine of Hermann Heller, Il concetto di legge della Costituzione di Weimar, in LA SOVRANITA ED ALTRI
SCRITTI SULLA DOTTRINA DEL DIRITTO E DELLO STATo 314,340 (Pasquale Pasquino trans., 1987) (1928).
6. PAUL LABAND, DAS STAATSRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES 11 (4th ed. 1991).
7. On the conceptual difference between "law in a formal meaning" and "law in a material
meaning," see also Jellinek,supra note 5, at 230, 237; Heller, supra note 5, at 314, 340.
8. LABAND,SUpra note 6, at 29, 32, 42.
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tion (the Parliament) that expresses its own consensus about the content of the
state's declarations of will. This value, though, results only because the laws are
adopted through the sanction of the Kaiser, regardless of the content of such acts.
The two concepts are radically different: one indicative of the form of the decla-
ration of will, and the other indicative of its content.
Further, the concept of law in a formal sense is useful to qualify the subjec-
tive holding of the legislative function over a specific material field: competence.
The distinction between law in a formal sense and law in a material sense leads
to the positivism of the concept of competence. This concept is therefore relevant
in the relationship between Bund and Lander, as well as its use with respect to the
budget, in the relations between the Parliament (Kaiser and Landtag) and
government-though the datum of the substantial identity between legislative
power and the state's sovereign authority assumes, in a historical-political con-
text, an authority that cannot be confirmed by the law: "Die Staatsgewalt in ab-
stracto ist durch das Gesetz niemals gebunden."
9
Therefore, on the one hand, we have competence, which is a product of the
state's sovereignty that permits member states to adopt legislative acts only in the
capacity based on their autonomy. On the other hand, we have the form that
qualifies the acts, which is reserved for the contribution of the political represen-
tation of the Parliament. In such a way, the guarantee of dualism is established
"between the new institution of representation and the new competences of the
sovereign," and between the Parliament and Government, which is typical of
the liberal constitutions of the nineteenth century.'As one can see, representa-
tion and a degree of democracy of law are not yet relevant.
One must also consider the role of the Bundesrat in qualifying the value of
the representation of member states when deciding the content of the legislative
acts adopted through sanctions of the Kaiser. The latter can obtain the applica-
tion of command acts of the Reich of legislative rank toward the member states
and the subjects, although it can never eliminate the material contributions of
the same states in defining the contents of the law. For these, the constitutionally
competent organ is the Bundersrat, not the Kaiser. The Kaiser, at most, through
his own sanction, makes a decision, which is a unitary act of the state's will-an
9. LABAND,supra note 6, at 74. The state power in abstracto can never be limited by the law itself.
10. Giuseppe G. Floridia, Regioni, diritto internazionale e diritto comunitario: diritto interno e di-
ritto internazionale: profli storico-comparatistici, at http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/
materiali/convegni/genova02O323/floridia.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
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act, which is the synthesis of the will of the individual members of the commu-
nity and is expressed in the course of the procedure for its assumption within the
law of the Reich.
Only later, with Heller, will the law in a material sense become a political act
qualified by the principle of the stato di diritto (Rechtsstaat). The law will be an
expression of the interest of general will, and will contain supreme law rules is-
sued by the legislative power of the people or by its representation (the Parlia-
ment). But as we already observed above, Heller's model is forcefully opposed to
the theoretical model presented by Laband. The latter, in fact, is built on the
basis of the distinction between the concepts of law in the formal sense and law
in the material sense. For Laband, the role of the representation does not con-
cern the relevance of the citizens' interests in determining the contents of the
law. Conversely, such a role relates to the formal concept in its capacity as a struc-
tural element of the procedure. This results from the influence exerted upon
Heller by the revolutionary bourgeoisie from Article 6 of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 ("La loi est l'expression de la volont6
g~n~rale"). I"
B. Post-Second World War
One century later, we arrive at the democratic and pluralistic constitution of
the post-Second World War era. In the Italian Constitution of 1947, law plays a
central role in the system because the law is the most important political act of
the Parliament. The constitutional system assigns to the Parliament the central
position among the constitutional organs of the state. The Parliament is the po-
litical center of the system; it is the most politically representative organ as long
as it is directly elected by the people and through a proportionate electoral sys-
11. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, IL CONTRATTO SOCIALE 0 PRINCIPI DI DIRITTO POLITICO 85, 155
(Gianluigi Barni trans., BUR Milano 1995) (1762); see also the critical positions pointed out during
the French Revolution by Maximilien Robespierre, now collected in LA RIVOLUZIONE GIACOBINA
(Umberto Cerroni ed., 1984) and LA RIVOLUZIONE GIACOBINA (F. Fabbricini trans., Umberto Cer-
roni ed., 1992). See id. at 134 (describing the relationship among law, justice, public interest, and
"volont g~n&al"). On the "Third State" and its rule in the Revolution and as holder of the
"volont6 gn6ral," and on the meaning of the political concept of "Nation," see EMMANUEL JOSEPH
SIEYkS, CHE COSA i IL TERZO STATO? (Umberto Cerroni trans., 1992); see also Carl Schmitt, Vor-
bemerkung fiber den Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und Demokratie, in DIE CEISTESCESCHICHT-
LICHE LACE DES HEUTIGEN PARLAMENTARISMUS 5, 30, 41 (Duncker & Hamblot 3d ed. 1961) (1926)
(providing a critical position against Parliament's doctrines).
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tern. The Constitution also gives the Parliament a central and dominant role to
reduce the political strength of the government. The political forces represented
in the Constituent Assembly, which was elected in 1946, radically opposed dif-
ferent ideological clusters and feared an overly strong government in case they
lost the political elections.
Naturally, I am trying to simplify issues which are far more complex. The
democratic-pluralistic constitutions of the second half of the twentieth century
also represent the first important reasons for the crisis of the parliamentary sys-
tems. That crisis has several reasons. The first is linked to the advent of mass de-
mocracy. It will soon be evident that the parliament will not be as capable of
guaranteeing the synthesis of general interests as in the liberal system. The ho-
mogeneous democracy of the bourgeoisie class of the nineteenth century was
much easier to achieve than the democracy of the contemporary pluralistic sys-
tem involving all citizens. The political meaning of the law itself will soon
change. It is sufficient to confront the meaning of the "reserve of law" (riserva di
legge) in the liberal constitutions, and in the democratic ones, beginning with the
Constitution of Weimar of 1919. The law loses its role as an instrument for pro-
tecting bourgeoisie property against the risk of arbitrary expropriations. The
law will no longer be the instrument by which the parliament defends the class
of proprietors-the only class represented by the law-against the aggressions
toward their property. Article 153 of the Constitution of Weimar calls upon the
law to discipline the very content of the property right. The property right must
guarantee the interest of the public and other subjects together with the interest
of the proprietor of the good. The legislator no longer protects the notion of
property rights, the sole interests of the proprietor, but rather has to construct the
synthesis of several interests in a single norm. In this way, the law changes its
own role and its own structure. It is no longer just a condition of legitimacy for
the expropriation of the inviolable right of property, no longer the reserve of
competence in favor of the bourgeoisie, but is rather an instrument for the disci-
pline of the content of the right and its limits.'2 The political consequence of this
historical datum thus will be the transformation of the law from an instrument
for the protection of the interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument for the
mediation of the social conflict.
12. The principle in the Weimar Constitution, then translated in the Grundgesetz, settles that
"Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich Dienst sein for Gemeine Beste."
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But the crisis of the systems also depends on other, more strictly juridical,
reasons. There is the birth of rigid constitutions-constitutions that the law it-
self cannot modify. A "superior law"'" (law that must be respected) is associated
with the control of constitutionality over contents of the law, to guarantee the su-
periority of the constitution. In this way, the law loses its political primacy in the
system although it remains the normative act, which is politically central for the
development of the system. The constitution will place alongside law other
equally important normative acts: governmental acts, acts of autonomous
bodies, and acts of reserved competence. However, the strongest meaning of the
law as a political act survives: the capability to give democracy a visibly practical
sense. The idea of law held by contemporary jurists, in fact, represents both the
essence and value of democracy. 14 It represents all interests involved in a deci-
sional process: the discussion among conflicting interests, their synthesis, and the
building of a new object-the general interest. The etymology of "parliament"
suggests the values of dialectics, debate, and proper procedure. In short, it is seen
as an instrument of compromise. In the debate between parties, most diverse
interests-through mediation, agreement, and compromise, achieved by re-
specting the parliamentary procedures-merge together and transform into
something different: namely, the general interest. This is the deep nexus be-
tween a parliamentary system and democracy. No other rulemaking process can
guarantee such a strong participation of different interests that results in the
construction of a rule that will govern them all.
The law, in the system of the "legislative parliamentary state,' 1 used to be
the moving center of the political system because the parliament, or the bour-
geoisie class, was the supreme body of the system. Conversely, the law of the con-
temporary legal culture is assumed to be the voice of political representation, as
the expression of the general will. Perhaps such an idea can be considered an il-
lusion, but it represents the political principle upon which the modern concept
of democracy is founded.
This is the theoretical datum that justifies my proposition: every system and
every foundation of legitimation of the legislative power that we have consid-
ered in a given historical moment depends on a political principle. Such a politi-
13. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1804).
14. See generally HANS KELSEN, VOM WESEN UND WERT DER DEMOKRATIE (1929).
15. Traditionally we refer to the French Constitution of 1875. LES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES DE
LA IIHUME RIEPUBLIQUE (1875) [Constitutional Laws of the Third Republic].
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cal principle that governs the legal system creates the foundation of the system:
the will of the sovereign in the absolute monarchy; the will of God in the theo-
cratic state; the will of the bourgeois parliament in the liberal state; and the in-
terests of the people in the contemporary democracy. However, there is yet
another main problem today: how do the interests of the people translate into the
contents of the juridical norms? Is the law of the parliament still the most effec-
tive instrument? I believe so. Indeed, I believe that it is the only instrument, as
long as the parliament is truly representative. Here, I put forward a concrete ex-
ample: the current Italian majority system does not guarantee Parliament the
exercise of its representative function. The Italian Parliament does not work
within legislative procedures to find an agreement to absorb the social conflict
and political tensions among the people. It is an instrument of the majority,
which creates strong marginalization. The most direct consequence of this
datum is the mutual delegitimation of the conflicting parties, but this is yet an-
other story.
II. THE CIVIL SOCIETY'S PARTICIPATION IN
DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES: A CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW
I do not like the idea that the direct participation of the interests involved in
the decisionmaking process represents a different form of democracy. I do not be-
lieve that individual European citizens, companies, private associations, unions,
and churches-in short, the civil society of the White Paper on European Gover-
nance--can really participate in the decisionmaking processes of the European
Union (EU), effectively substituting a representative parliament. The idea is not
new. For instance, Niklas Luhmann, in his famous 1969 essay entitled Legitima-
tion durch Verfahren, had already proposed a critical analysis of such a model. This
book is important for its content and not just its title. I say this because often the
title of this volume has been used as a synthesis of its contents, at least in the Italian
literature, as if the book were meant to demonstrate that the participation in the
decisionmaking process is sufficient to politically legitimize a decision. But this is
not what Luhmann recounts in his book. To the contrary, Luhmann intended to
construct the role of the participation of citizens in decisionmaking processes as a
category of justice. The idea presents the struggle of individual rights against the
16. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on European Governance,
COM(2001)428 final.
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establishment, as opposed to the rights as instruments to legitimize the establish-
ment. The participation must allow equal chances for all the interests compro-
mised by a given decision (substantial justice) and search for the objective truth
through the rules (due process of law). Franco Ledda, an important Italian scholar
of administrative law, described the participation in the decisionmaking process
in opposite terms to the ones used in the White Paper, such as "[iun praise of dis-
sent" and "resistance of the interests," and not the manifestation of the consensus.
This is the background issue, the pivotal point, and the main objection to the
proposed model. In this context, the rights of participation are instruments of
warranty against the illegitimate forms of exercising power. The model should
provide: (a) rights of political participation that guarantee the democratic nature
of the system; and (b) rights of defense against aggression toward one's goods
and substantial interests by the use of democratic power. Constitutionalism has
accustomed us to this way. The rule of law defends the rights of individuals even
against democratic decisions, but the model of governance pays attention to only
one of the two elements; indeed, it conflates one within the other.
The participation of various interests in the political process will never be
equal for all. Not all of the interests involved in the decisionmaking process have
the same strength, the same capability, or the same information. The conclusion
is obvious: the participatory rights are privileges for the few, not rights for all.
The absence of equality in the rights of political participation is incompatible
with the idea of contemporary democracy. European citizens have become con-
sumers. Is the meaning of the two words the same?
In a different context, we should pay attention to every form of sectorial
agreement that could facilitate compromise each time the interests involved in a
decisionmaking process are complex and in contention with each other. I am
thinking now of a new form of negotiation among labor unions (syndicates),
firms, associations, and the government, like we had in Italian politics during
the 1990s. Agreements have been implemented to plan some important eco-
nomic and financial policies by the public institutions, by involving private and
social actors in public decisionmaking, and this could enforce common consent
on public policies, even when painful for the people. This way of shaping poli-
cies' content is called in Italy "concertazione,"'7 and, in the European context,
17. On the recent Italian experience, see Giorgio Fontana, Crisi della legge e negoziazione legisla-
tiva nella transizione istituzionale italiana, in TRASFORMAZIONI DELLA FUNZIONE LEGISLATIVA, II, CRISI
DELLA LEGGE E SISTEMA DELLE FONTI 117 (Franco Modugno ed., 2000).
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should be used to affect communitarian directives in social fields (Amsterdam
Treaty). This is a kind of alternative participation in decisionmaking processes
that I approve as a real form of consent of private interests on public choices be-
cause of both its highly representative capability of the subjects involved, and the
importance, in the democratic sense, of equality in rights to participation.
Il1. AN EXAMPLE: THE WORKS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
FUTURE OF THE EU
A. The New "European Law Acts"
The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe for the first time
proposes to modify the name of the EU normative acts. The regulation will be
called European law; the directive becomes European framework-law. The
name "European law" clarifies what the role of this normative act should be, but
is its nature comparable to the nature of the law of the state? The EU system, in
fact, is not founded on the principle of division of powers. There is no theory of
sources in EU law, and no attention is given to the formal and substantial char-
acteristics of legislative acts. We do not have appropriate juridical categories
(terms) to understand the following questions: Why should legal acts have a spe-
cific form (typical formal signs) and a specific content (general, abstract, norma-
tive)? Why should they be distinguished by types? Why should we look at the
subject (the organ) that adopts the normative act to classify this act? There are no
answers to these theoretical questions in the European system.
Furthermore, European law does not recognize autonomous legitimation
for political action as such. In the national systems, each government is free to
decide its own policy within the framework of constitutional rules. Is the case
the same in Europe? The problem of which European institutions correspond to
state government is beyond the scope of this paper. It is a complex question to
which I tried to provide the answer in another paper.'8 I am content with re-
marking that the normative structure of EU treaties produces the neutralization
18. See Francesco Bilancia, Presentation at the Conference on La costituzione materiale: percorsi
culturali e attualitd di un'ideaz, Brevi note su costituzione materiale, legalit4 ed Unione europea, Inter-
vento (Mar. 16-18, 2001), reprinted in La costituzione materiale: Percorsi culturali e attualitd di u'idea,
in QUADERNI DELLA RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 425 (A. Catelani & S. Labriola eds., 2001); see also
FRANCESCO BILANCIA, I DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI COME CONQUISTE SOVRASTATALI DI CIVILTA: IL DIRITTO
Di PROPRIETA NELLA CEDU 18 (2002).
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of every political motion (action). 9 The institutional aims of the European sys-
tem, in fact, are all described in the provision concerning the market economy,
competition, and EU policies. Out of the competences established by the norms,
there is no room for political autonomy. It is the states that, in building the sys-
tems of the treaties, have already set all the targets of the EU. They have com-
posed such targets in detail in a set of enumerated competences. They have
protected such targets by entrusting the Commission with legislative initiative
and vigilance over the application of EU laws.
Such a normative technique is entirely resumed by the project of the consti-
tutional treaty. The competences of the EU20 are all defined as procedures to be
applied according to the dispositions contained in Title 3 of the Treaty. More-
over, the European policy is subject to rigorous judicial control by the Court of
Justice in order to guarantee respect for the legal parameters in which the policy
is bridled; according to the importance of this judicial review in the European
legal system, Massimo Severo Giannini, one of the most important Italian jurists
of the twentieth century, had already proposed to qualify the EU law as a system
of administrative law (in the sense that it is "nonconstitutional").2'
However, there is a paradox in that system: the Court of Justice is the only
authority endowed with political initiative, and it is strongly determined to use
all its power, well beyond the content of the treaties and perhaps against the
states' wills. The Court of Justice is the only institution that politically stimulates
the system,22 apart from the states, within the European Council. The rest is all
planned, in detail, by the norms, procedures, competences, and agencies of con-
trol, and guarantees respect for EU law, in the hands of the Commission and the
Court itself.
But which acts, decisions, or decisionmaking procedures should be ren-
dered more democratic? Making a decision and making the procedure more
transparent are both noble goals and important commitments, and the Commis-
19. See Gianni Ferrara, I diritti politici nell'ordinamento europeo, in A.I.C., LA COSTITUZIONE
EUROPEA 473 (2000).
20. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed Oct. 29, 2004, art. 1-12, 2004 O.J.
(C 310).
21. See Massimo Severo Giannini, Profili di un diritto amministrativo delle ComunitA europee,
Address at a 1967 conference in Rome, reprinted in Riv. TRIM. DIR. PUBBL 982 (2003).
22. See Marco Dani, Dall'inquietudine all'integrazione: riflessionisu mercato esocialitei nello spazio
costituzionale europeo, in IL PROCESSO DI COSTITUZIONALIZZAZIONE DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA: SAGGI SU
VALORI E PRESCRITTIVITA DELL'INTEGRAZIONE COSTITUZIONALE SOVRANAZIONALE 315 (R. Toniatti & F
Palermo eds., 2004).
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sion seems to be aware of this. But is it really possible that, apart from transpar-
ency, the effective participation of the involved interests can be guaranteed? Are
we sure that the participation of all the involved interests-for example, the in-
terests of both the large company, on the one hand, and the individual citizen/
consumer, on the other-could be effective without selection and in a regime of
substantial equality? I remind the audience that, at least in Italy, the consumers'
associations are neither open nor representative; they perform a mere lobbying
activity in the tutelage of specific interests.
We should also consider that the EU system is basically oriented along the
case law of the Court of Justice, which is implemented in the states' legal systems
as compulsory European Law. This order is constitutionally implemented more
by jurisprudence23 than by the legal acts of Parliament and Council. That is why
I do not understand what the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
Union will mean for the advancement of the law considering that the protection
of fundamental rights should be provided for by law.24 There will not be a Euro-
pean law until the new treaty is in force. The only European law that has regu-
lated this subject until now is the Court of Justice's case law, which represents the
foundations of the Charter itself. But this case law is not able to create a new Eu-
ropean common law, because the European Council law is not "common" at all.
It is not based on equality among citizens (there are no peers). Instead, the law pro-
ceeds from a specific political program, 25 which is well-known and gives rise to a
compound system of interests, in which individuals and big corporations are con-
sidered equal. When Article 6 of the EU Treaty says, "The Union is founded on
the principles of democracy and the rule of law and principles which are common
to the Member States," it certainly refers to the classical, common concept of de-
mocracy, founded on parliamentary legal procedures, 26 open to all the interests
there represented. Thus, the democratic foundations of the Union are a synthesis
of the traditional cultural concepts of citizens' participation, subject to the law and
23. See Roberto Toniatti, llprincipio di rule of law e laformazionegiurisprudenziale deldiritto cos-
tituzionale dell'Unione europea, in COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA E DIRITTO COMUNITARIO: PRINCIPI E
TRADIZIONI COSTITUZIONALI COMUNI: LA FORMAZIONE GIURISPRUDENZIALE DEL DIRITTO COSTITUZION-
ALE EUROPEO 503 (Silvio Gambino ed., 2002).
24. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52, 1, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 21
("Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be
provided for by law.").
25. See Dani,supra note 22, at 305.
26. See M.P. ladicicco, Fonti comunitarie e riserva di legge, in DIRITTo PUBBLICO INTERNO E COMU-
NITARIO (2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, Seconda UniversitA degli Studi di Napoli).
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decisionmaking procedures, with all their conflicting interests represented in
those procedures.27 Equality of chances is the topic of the question. And this equal-
ity could not be guaranteed by the principle of "participatory democracy" set forth
in Article 1-46 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
28
B. The Complex Structure of European Legislative Institutions
In general, scholars propose a parallel analysis between the legislative proce-
dure of the EU, which involves the Commission, the Council, and the European
Parliament, and one of the individual Member States. Such a comparison, even
if useful, is not simple. In the EU there is no trace of the division of power be-
tween legislative institutions and governmental institutions. The analysis should
be conducted by separating the interests of the community (defined by the trea-
ties but decided by the states), the interests of the government, the interests of the
citizens, and the interests of the firms. But I cannot make such a division in order
to allocate them to different institutions. In other words, I believe that it is not
easy to imagine for the EU the same institutional balance that has characterized
the mixed English government for several centuries. I am referring to the histor-
ical balance among the interests of different social classes in the trilateral rela-
tions between the English Crown, Lords, and Commons. Further, an important
point for me is that the normative acts of the EU are not like the laws of the
states. They do not represent the fundamental political choices of the system.
Such choices are already written in the treaties. The European laws are mere
acts of execution of such choices-my issue stems from this very fact. If we think
about how the mixed English government was created, how the parliamentary
regime came about in that system29 (since the first traces written in the Magna
Carta of 1215), and how some institutions have evolved (such as the Privy Coun-
cil, first, and the Cabinet at a later stage), we can learn an important lesson in
order to evaluate the role played by the panels as political institutions. The
power of the panel was established in opposition to the monocratic power of the
27. See the very interesting reflections of M. Dani & F. Palermo, Della governance e di altri
demoni (un dialogo), in QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 785 (2003).
28. So I finally agree with the conclusions of FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, THREE GENERATIONS OF PAR-
TICIPATION RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGs (Jean Monnet Ctr for Int'l & Reg'l
Econ. L. & Justice, N.Y.U. Sch. of L., Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 11/03, 2003), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/0 3/03 1101.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
29. Here I refer literally to the teachings of Gianni Ferrara.
FRANCESCO BILANCIA
King. English constitutionalism teaches that the diffusion of power is obtained
through the political panel. Panel means pluralism in the selection process, as
well as the synthesis of the interests to be represented in decisions. In England, in
reference to such interests, the barons will be considered first, then the interests
of the Commons, and finally the interests of the populace. Conversely, what is
the representative role played by the Council of Ministers-the highest political
authority of the EU? Is it also a panel created to diffuse the power into plural-
ism? No, it is not. Rather, it represents the EU government, its own policies, and
the various interests separated by nationality.
Indeed, we face the opposite case: the Council of Ministers is a panel created
to concentrate power 30 and to separate the political responsibility of each of its
members from the control of the citizens of each Member State. It is a panel that
creates this effect; through mutual legitimation, it breaks the link between these
members and their responsibilities toward their citizens. Each decision made in
Europe is then imposed on the Member States. The governments decide to-
gether and then implement these decisions independently. In so doing, their ac-
tions are immune from any consequences. The Ministers legitimize their actions
by attributing them to their constituents, saying essentially, "Europe asks this
from us!"
In his capacity as the Vice President of the Convention for the Future of the
EU, the organ entrusted3 with writing the first draft of the new European con-
stitutional treaty, Giuliano Amato put forth an interesting proposal to break the
dependency of the EU Council on the national governments. His proposal is to
transform the "Legislative and General Affairs Council 3 2 into a permanent or-
gan, composed no longer of the same ministers of the state governments, but by
ministers chosen and appointed ad hoc. They would still be state ministers, but
they would stay permanently in Europe. In this case, we would have a true
European Parliament-a legislative parliament, typical of federal states. The
30. See again the theoretical position and the scientific doctrine of Gianni Ferrara, La sovraniti
statale tra esercizio congiunto e delega permanente, in RIPENSARE LO STATO: ATTI DEL CONVEGNO DI
STUDI, NAPOLi, 22-23 MARZO 2002, at 657 (Silvano Labriola ed., 2003).
31. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in
Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, SN
300/1/01 REV 1, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms-Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/68827.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
32. The European Convention, Secretariat, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe, art. 23, 1, CONV 850/03, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/
cv00850.enO3.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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Parliament would have two chambers. One chamber would be appointed by the
citizens, and the other would represent the governments of the Member States.
This second chamber would work for the general interest more efficiently,
being less dependent upon the governments. Indeed, such a chamber would be
slightly more distant from the interests of the individual governments, and thus
slightly more motivated to pursue a superior general interest, which would be
perhaps closer to the European Parliament. However, the state governments did
not accept this solution; thus, nothing will change in the EU institutional setting.
What remains is the current European Parliament and its battles before the
European Court of Justice in order to maintain, inasmuch as it is possible, the
procedure of co-decision. Once again, we need to wait for the practical actions of
the EU institutions to determine which interests will prevail in the European
decisionmaking procedures. Yet, the deficit of representation in the European
institutions will remain the same. In theory, every representative organ, to be
truly representative, must reproduce the same structure as the represented
body.33 Therefore, the parliament of a complex society should represent the plu-
ral society as a whole. In other words, the parliament should reproduce the or-
ganic structure of the source of its own legitimacy. One such example is civil
society. In order to involve a civil society in the decisionmaking process, the rep-
resentatives must participate in the workings of the EU Convention. They have
been heard in a single hearing, together with the representatives of the regional
bodies, the advisory bodies and all the other subjects who are marginally in-
volved in the process of the project's development. Although this appears to be
democratic participation at work, we must keep in mind that the Convention
put forth a draft constitution without having received any popular mandate and
without voting even once. The draft has been adopted by a consensus. I also
think we need more participation, more information, more equality, more intel-
lectual honesty, and more democracy. But how can those be achieved, if not
through an actual and effective representative regime?
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